Figure 1. Norwegian aid to Myanmar by sector, 2011-2023. (Data source: Norad’s online aid statistics for Myanmar).
Kristian Stokke
Norway has for long claimed to be a supporter of democratization in Myanmar and has gained recognition for awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 and hosting the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) for two decades from 1992. But Norway has also been criticized for its close engagement with the military regime during its transition to electoral autocracy, the premature lifting of sanctions and rapid growth of business investments under the Thein Sein government (2011-2015), and for being too passive after the 2021 military coup.
Although Norway has signed on to joint statements that condemn the coup and has called for ‘restoration’ of democracy, the Norwegian government has neither imposed sanctions on the military nor provided direct support for the federal democratic revolution.
Myanmar remains a prioritized partner country for Norwegian aid and the allocations have increased since the coup. This raises critical questions about the strategies, priorities and channels of Norwegian aid. This short text will shed some light on these questions based on publicly available aid statistics supplemented by my own observations of Norwegian aid since 2011.
The priorities of Norwegian aid to Myanmar
The website of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) provides information about the sectors, partners and projects that have received Norwegian aid each year. Figure 1 shows the growth and overall composition of aid to Myanmar during the period from 2011 to 2023. Norwegian aid increased rapidly during the Thein Sein government, from 105 million in 2011 to 256 million NOK in 2015. Thereafter the level of aid remained stable at 250-280 million NOK per year before going up to 333 million NOK in 2023.
The figure also shows that there have been important changes in the sectoral priorities over these 13 years. From 2011 to 2015, Norway pursued interlinked roles as diplomatic door-opener and peacebuilder for the Thein Sein government, business investor in telecommunication and the energy sector, and state capacity builder at the Union level. Aid was strategically linked to economic development and focused on sectors where Norway has special interests and expertise. An additional tier of aid focused on humanitarian assistance, education, health and civil society development, but these were secondary priorities compared to the investments in economic growth and state capacity building. Both tiers of aid were justified with reference to the so-called ‘democratic transition’, but Norway’s democracy assistance was indirect and developmental rather than direct and political.
Norway continued this combination of aid and investments during the NLD government but arguably in a more tempered manner, as the new democratic government sought to clean up after the bonanza of investment agreements during the Thein Sein period.
Since the 2021 coup, Norwegian aid has been marked by a changing continuity: Whereas the high level of aid and the emphasis on working from the inside (rather than cross-border) remain relatively unchanged, the sectoral composition of aid has changed. Most strikingly, the relative importance of the two tiers has been reversed. While aid for state capacity building; environment and energy; and production and trade have been terminated, there is a marked increase in aid for emergency assistance, health, education and civil society. Figure 2 shows that 92% of Norwegian aid to Myanmar in 2023 falls within these four categories, and the background data indicates that the support for governance and peace has shifted from the state to civil society.
These post-coup shifts should, in theory, make Norwegian aid more relevant for the current struggle for federal democracy, especially if aid is delivered through partnerships with key actors within this movement. Closer inspection of the aid channels reveals, however, that this has not happened.
The channels for Norwegian aid
Norway’s post-coup aid to Myanmar is mainly channeled through two partner groups: Norwegian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral organizations, primarily UN organizations (Figure 3). A smaller amount of aid is channeled through international and local NGOs. The public sectors in Norway and Myanmar became important channels for aid during the Thein Sein government and there was also some aid to the private sector linked to corporate investments (e.g. Telenor, SN Power, Equinor, Yara), but this has stopped after the coup.
The amount of aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs has remained relatively stable since the 2021 coup while the aid to multilateral organizations has more than doubled, from 56 million NOK in 2020 to 135 MNOK in 2023. Conversely, the channeling of aid through international and local NGOs has been halved, from 46 to 24 MNOK. In 2023, as much as 89% of Norway’s aid to Myanmar was channeled through Norwegian NGOs and multilateral organizations, while another 7% was channeled through other NGOs (Figure 4).
Norway’s aid to Myanmar is thus marked by the hegemonic position of multilateral organizations and Norwegian NGOs. The latter channel is dominated by a handful of large and professional humanitarian and development NGOs that are close partners with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Norad across many aid-receiving countries. While they champion divergent interests when it comes to aid priorities, the actors within the MFA/Norad-NGO nexus seem to hold converging views on Myanmar’s political situation and the appropriate mode of aid delivery. This hegemonic position and discourse constitute major obstacles for smaller and less professionalized organizations. This is for example demonstrated by the exclusion of Burmese diaspora organizations from aid contracts and dialog meetings, despite their proven capacity to deliver vital aid inside conflict zones based on contextual knowledge, locally defined needs and flexible networks and collaboration with local partners.
Furthermore, Norad’s aid statistics also show that all aid channeled through multilateral organizations and most of the aid that goes through Norwegian NGOs are implemented by their own local offices or by other international NGOs. The most notable exceptions are the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the Students’ and Academics’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH) and the Strømme Foundation, who continue to implement all or large parts of their projects through local NGOs. In contrast, Save the Children Norway lists Myanmar’s Ministry of Education as their implementing partner for one project. And the Norwegian Red Cross works in partnership with Myanmar Red Cross, either directly or through the International Committee for the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent. These partnerships raise critical questions about conflict sensitivity in the current context of Myanmar.
The donor-driven and top-down channeling of Norwegian aid to Myanmar is in marked contrast to the emphasis on ‘localization’ and ‘locally led development’ within international aid discourse. It is only within the area of governance, civil society and conflict preventing that there is some direct support to local NGOs, primarily from the Norwegian Embassy in Yangon (Figure 5).
Norad’s aid statistics do not provide information about the geography of aid delivery. There is no easily available data on which areas that receive aid, and whether they are accessed from military-controlled areas or from territories controlled by the National Unity Government (NUG), Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs). Other information sources suggest that Norwegian aid is largely disbursed from junta-controlled areas rather than cross-border and that local organizations are typically left out in the decision-making and delivery of aid. The Norwegian MFA has reportedly shown little flexibility on this matter and upholds administrative requirements that make it difficult to access and deliver aid inside the areas that have been most severely affected after the military coup.
There is also no indication that Norwegian aid is delivered in collaboration with key actors within the movement for federal democracy. While it is known that Norwegian diplomats have had some dialog with NUG and EROs, the latter have had little influence on Norwegian aid priorities and the actual delivery of Norwegian aid is typically bypassing these actors. Although Norway’s post-coup prioritization of emergency assistance, education, health and civil society aligns with local needs in the most affected areas, the possibilities for meeting these needs through the local governance systems of NUG, EROs and PDFs are ignored. This hampers the effectiveness of aid and precludes strategic linkages to democratization and federalism from below.
This brief analysis supports the conclusion that although Norwegian aid to Myanmar is sizeable and oriented towards vital needs, it is channeled in ways that limits its effectiveness in supporting the goal of federal democracy or the need for livelihood assistance and basic services in conflict-affected areas. While statistical information on the distribution of Norwegian aid is unavailable, it is a common perception that it fails to reach the most vital social groups, geographical areas and political actors. Despite its stated commitments, Norwegian aid is missing the target at a critical moment in Myanmar’s political history.
Towards a more effective aid strategy
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently revising its country strategy for aid to Myanmar. Considering the above analysis, I will propose five principles that I deem essential for a more effective strategy and as benchmarks for future assessments of Norwegian aid.
1. The overarching goal for Norwegian aid should be to support federal democracy.
The MFA has signaled that they consider democracy, human rights, peace and reconciliation, and basic services as general goals for Norway’s aid to Myanmar. These are promising signals, but it should be recognized that federalism and democracy are more overarching goals than the others and that these two goals are mutually constitutive and inseparable. The popular mass movement against military dictatorship is based on a vision of a federal democratic Myanmar that is given a formal basis through the repeal of the 2008 Constitution; the Federal Democracy Charter; the National Unity Government; and different local constitutional processes. If Norway adopts a singular focus on democracy, it will go against this unification of longstanding demands and have negative political consequences. The other goals for Norwegian aid – human rights, peace and reconciliation, and basic services – are subsidiary goals that contribute to and are contingent on the development of federal democracy.
2. Aid priorities should be strategically linked to the goal of federal democracy.
Democracy assistance was also identified as a main goal in the previous strategy, but this was not followed by strategic actions in support if its realization. The new country strategy should therefore place much stronger emphasis on the linkages between the overarching goal of federal democracy, the general aid priorities and the specific aid projects. Priority should be given to sectors and projects that contribute directly and substantially to the building of a federal democratic Myanmar. This could mean a stronger focus on political democracy assistance but may also entail developmental democracy assistance if the strategic linkages are more explicit and direct than in the past. While support for education and healthcare, for example, may remain a priority, the overarching goal requires that it is delivered in a manner that contributes more effectively to the development of federal democracy.
3. Aid should be channeled in ways that support federal democracy.
The analysis of Norwegian aid to Myanmar shows that most of it is channeled through multilateral organizations and Norwegian NGOs that operate from junta-controlled areas and have weak or no links to key actors within the federal democracy movement. Such channeling prevents effective delivery to the areas that are most severely affected by military atrocities and raise critical questions about the socio-spatial unevenness and conflict sensitivity of Norwegian aid. It is vital that Norway develops channeling strategies that mitigate these shortcomings. To support the overarching goal, aid organizations must work with rather than around the movement for federal democracy.
4. Decision-making and delivery of aid must include local actors.
It is a normative goal for much of Norwegian aid that it should be ‘localized’ or ‘locally led’. The above analysis indicates that Norway’s aid to Myanmar fails to meet this normative goal, as it is dominated by external actors and top-down delivery. Local actors receive little support and have limited or no influence on the decision-making and implementation of aid-funded projects. Norway’s new aid strategy should therefore prioritize substantive inclusion of local actors. Given the overarching goal, this especially means that Norwegian aid organizations must collaborate closely with key organizations within the movement for federal democracy and implement aid projects in partnership with their local administration systems and civil society.
5. Norway should strengthen its contextual knowledge and analytical capacities.
The Myanmar context is complex and changing. This situation requires contextual knowledge and informed analyses as a basis for effective engagement strategies. Such capacities have been insufficiently developed within the Norwegian aid system. This has left the MFA, Norad and NGOs ill-prepared for political changes such as the 2021 military coup and the rise of a revolutionary mass movement for federal democracy, or the changing complexity of armed resistance to military rule and authoritarian conflict management. The new country strategy should thus prioritize a concerted effort to strengthen the contextual knowledge and analytical capacities among Norwegian actors on politics and development in Myanmar.
Kristian Stokke is Professor of Political Geography at the University of Oslo and has conducted research on democratization and conflicts in Myanmar for more than a decade.
