Mizzima
Crisis Group Asia released a new report on 27 March looking at relations between China and Myanmar titled Scam Centres and Ceasefires: China-Myanmar Ties Since the Coup.
The report points out that notwithstanding a recent flurry of diplomacy, China remains unhappy with Myanmar’s military regime and resistant to normalising relations. This was well demonstrated when in late 2023, China gave tacit support to a major rebel offensive in north-eastern Myanmar that dealt the junta a resounding defeat in a strategic enclave on the Chinese border.
Crisis Group believes that Myanmar-China relations are important because China has more leverage in Myanmar than any other foreign power. While it cannot dictate outcomes, it can influence events. Beijing is cautious about outside involvement in its neighbourhood, but its ambivalence about the regime leaves room for greater international consensus on how to deal with Myanmar’s post-coup crisis.
The report says that for China, the February 2021 coup was an unwelcome complication in its relations with neighbouring Myanmar. Xi Jinping had built warm relations with the Aung San Suu Kyi administration and was preparing major infrastructure projects across the country that would connect south-western China to the Bay of Bengal – part of Beijing’s long-held strategic and economic objectives.
The coup brought insecurity and uncertainty to Myanmar, making big investments unviable. It also brought to power a leader, Min Aung Hlaing, who harbours markedly anti-China sentiments, even by the standards of the military he leads.
As a result, Beijing has declined to normalise relations with the regime, and it continues to signal its unhappiness bilaterally (declining to invite Min Aung Hlaing to China despite much lobbying) and multilaterally (allowing the NUG-supporting Myanmar permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) to remain in his seat in New York).
China’s tacit support for the armed offensive against the military and its allies in the Kokang region is an even more striking signal of its irritation, in particular at the regime’s failure to take action against scam centres targeting Chinese nationals.
But as the report points out, Beijing’s displeasure has not, however, translated into disengagement. As part of a longstanding border management approach, it seeks to maintain relations with all the main parties to preserve its leverage and stop geopolitical rivals from capitalising on turmoil. Nor, should push come to shove, would it likely stand idly by and let the regime collapse, lest it be replaced by the Western-leaning NUG or some other configuration of a broadly anti-China resistance movement.
Crisis Group believes that there is room for different actors to work together on improving outcomes in Myanmar.
While China has traditionally taken a border management approach that focuses on minimising active conflict, it should resist overly transactional or short-term approaches in favour of promoting long-term stability, including by supporting legal sources of income in enclaves under the sway of armed groups along its border, while pushing to end illicit activity across the board, not merely the forms that have the biggest impact on China and its citizens.
The report also says that the NUG’s long-term strategic interests would be best served if it continues signalling that it is neither excessively Western-leaning nor a threat to Chinese interests in the region, even if this does not immediately lead to warmer relations with Beijing.
Crisis Group believes that building an international consensus for action on Myanmar, including at the Security Council, remains difficult but not impossible. While maintaining dialogue and preserving the possibility for future action is key, members should seize opportunities to raise the profile of Myanmar’s oft-forgotten plight for a global audience.
