Two major Chinese hydro-power projects an important concern for junta and opposition

Ai Sai (Mao Land)

Significant areas of Myanmar’s northern battlefields are effectively large investment projects that potentially benefit not just the Myanmar junta and the People’s Republic of China but also opposition forces. 

Little wonder that China’s interests are to be protected by both sides in the Myanmar conflict as part of the agreement signed recently between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the State Administration Council or SAC.

Similarly, the opposition National Unity Government has promised to continue a “warm partnership with Beijing”, taking measures to safeguard Chinese economic investments and other socio-economic enterprises within Myanmar. 

There should be little surprise that all Myanmar groups seek to maintain the China’s attention because of the benefits and income to be derived from foreign investment, and the importance of cross-border trade. 

Two hydro-power projects stand out when assessing Chinese interests in northern Myanmar.

Recently, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) captured the army’s posts, encampments, and light infantry Battalions in Moe Mauk township of Kachin state. And they managed to drive the junta soldiers out of their outpost at the Tarpein hydropower plant.

The TarPein hydro plant lies at the head of Tarpein River and it is a joint venture investment of China and Myanmar. It has been developed to provide 240 megawatts and the project started in 2007. However, the project was impeded by the resumption of the war between the KIA and the junta.

According to the MOU of the hydro-power project, the residual portion of power, altogether 8 per cent out of developed electric power is supposed to be available to the Myanmar people – but there has been no electricity distribution to the people because no power distribution has been installed.

As a result of this failure to honour the agreement, China has acquired this 8 per cent portion of power at the low price of 1 unit for 18 kyats. In addition, the Myanmar government pay back the debt and compensation for the destruction of some parts of plants in fighting around 2011. China has been asking for payments of projects debt by installment.

Tar Pein Hydro-power plant was a player in the resumption of war in Kachin state around 2011. Initial fighting started in response to the Myanmar military checking out security at the plant. This prompted the resumption of fighting between the KIA and Myanmar army.

Tar Pein Hydropower plant is under KIA control now. 

Another plant is Ruli hydro-power plant in Nam Kham township in Shan State. It started running in 2008 and with a capacity of 600 megawatts. It directly supports the nickel mine project in Maung Kong in Htee Kyaint township of Sagaing Region. The management of the hydro-power project is under the control of a Chinese company.

Prior to the 2021 coup, a parliament member asked for hydro-power electricity to be supplied to the local people. However, the then government rejected the call, implying the project was under the control of the Chinese company.

TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army seized the Ruli hydropower plant as they were waging operation code.(No).1027. 

Both of power plants continue running under two ethnic rebel groups’ control situation. 

There are either ongoing developing hydro Power projects under the Kokang rebel and Wa rebel UWSA controlling area along the Salween river basin.

China’s leadership is now emphasizing sustainable and scientific development along with its renewable energy targets for the coming decades, which stand to more than double to existing hydropower generating capacity. In response, Myanmar, with its rich hydroelectric power resources but plagued by power shortages, seems to have no other choice than to open the door for significant foreign involvement in projects on the main streams of its leading rivers.

For most Myanmar people, their dissatisfaction and anger lie in the current power shortage in the country while many dams have been built in the past decades. This means the Myanmar people still have not benefited from the dams. Some ascribe this to Chinese exploitation because they think that most power generated by the hydropower stations is transmitted back to China.

Come into the mind and interesting questions are: which agreement could work well under this situation, How can the SAC collect the revenue and selling benefits of hydropower sectors regarding China, and how can ethnic armed groups be involved in such give-and-take circumstances with China and interactively guard for Chinese-owned projects? 

But, surely, Myanmar people are waiting and trying to cross broad daylight with sizzling hot under the Summer season’s sunny days without electricity.