Reviewed by Joseph Ball
As Myanmar’s varied resistance groups continue in their quest to end the reign of military rule in Myanmar, a key – if not the key – catchword shared among these groups is that of federalism.
The concept is often held out as a beacon of light at the end of the long and arduous struggle. But the achievement of such a goal is not an easy task. In this context, The Politics of Federalization in Myanmar (hereafter referred to as Politics of Federalization) offers a timely assessment of the obstacles to, and demands of, federalism, providing a historical background to the country’s struggles to come to grips with federalism and offering an insight into what needs to happen to render this vision a reality.
Make no mistake, the advent of a workable federalist system is not an easy task. As author Dulyapak Preecharush remarks in the early pages of Politics and Federalization, it is a taxing job to realize “political compromises amid residual conflict”. But at the heart of Preecharush’s thesis lies the assessment that the “federating process is driven by the three major political issues of constitutionalization, conflict management, and democratization.” Yet, crucially, “each by itself is insufficient to see federalism through”.
Politics of Federalization identifies four critical junctures in the history of modern Myanmar at which the possibilities of constitutionalization, conflict management, and democratization have coalesced to make the realization of federalism (or at least significant strides toward federalism) a real possibility. These years were 1947, 1962, 1988, and 2011. And, depending on the trajectory of the current conflict, presumably a further opportunity will present itself at some point down the road.
However, previous opportunities for federalism at the identified critical junctures clearly failed. With respect to the current conflict, this proved to the be case in the hoped for transition period commencing with 2011. Nevertheless, Politics of Federalization observes that it is important to recognize that, at least in theory, all parties were seeking some form of federal agreement but differed in how to get there and what it should look like. This has been true since the first critical juncture in 1947, when “managing deep-rooted conflict over sensitive ethnic-territorial issues” created conditions arguing for the necessity of a long-term vision of federalism for the country.
At the time of the initial critical juncture, Preecharush continues, “Due to the quick political negotiation between Myanmar leaders and the British government as well as the majority and minority leaders’ limited knowledge of constitutional matter and federalism, post-war independent Myanmar faced a problematic state-building project.” Today, this limited knowledge regarding federalism, including among the Myanmar population at large, continues to impact the prospects for federalism in Myanmar.
The author continues his analysis with “The events at this critical juncture necessitated a quick outcome, so key actors had to finalize discussions and choose options as promptly as possible. As a result, in-depth insights about federalism and thorough understandings of each key stakeholder’s political decisions were overlooked to some extent.” This would seem to infer, along with the need for education on federalism, that Panglong was hardly a solution, let alone a comprehensive blueprint for federalism in Myanmar. Rather, Panglong should be understood as a hoped-for starting point for much more detailed discussions and negotiations.
This juncture further highlights the impact of the speed with which Myanmar’s leaders pursued the country’s post-colonial independence. It was a tactic in stark contrast to some other British colonial territories, such as Malaysia. It was also a tactic, as Preecharush notes, of which the British were highly skeptical owing to “the historical lack of deep integration between the two governing units,” namely Burma Proper and the Frontier Areas. Essentially, Burmese leaders attempted to organize a group – the national community –which did not exist. This may be one reason why a rare, and highly debatable, clause providing for a right to secession was included in the 1947 constitution. Going forward, it will be important to correctly judge an appropriate pace and sequence for the federating process.
All this points to another critical component of the federalizing process: the role of a country’s elites and the overlapping nature of democratization, conflict management, and constitutionalization. As Politics of Federalization relates, “it is difficult to separate the nature of strategic competition and the belief systems of elites from the federalizing process.” Moreover, throughout Myanmar’s struggles to come to grips with the dynamics of federalism, “the democratization process, including combining the ethnic Burman Buddhist civilian elite and the Tatmadaw, and peace processes for managing conflict are necessarily connected but insufficiently interlinked in any highly positive way.”
Politics of Federalization stresses that federalism is not a new concept to Myanmar, while at the same time a concept which all sides to the political struggle accept they must confront. Unfortunately, to date, the story of federalism in Myanmar is one of persistent failure. To look at one recent example, within the post-2011 constitutional amendment process, federalization became a footnote to intra-Burman political posturing. While all sides acknowledged some need for federalism, power politics at the center of the state worked to the detriment of the peace and federating processes. These processes in turn became political tools for the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Tatmadaw through which to pursue their own political objectives vis-à-vis the other.
Continuing with the most recent critical juncture identified by Preecharush, the decade following 2011 served as a transition period during which there arose an increase in political consciousness across Myanmar society. And as we look to the fallout from the 2021 coup, the current conflict continues this transition, albeit in a much more violent form and with deliberation and tolerance replaced by armed opposition, and with military and civilian camps within government replaced by the State Administration Council (SAC), National Unity Government (NUG), and other resistance organizations.
It bears noting that the bulk of Politics of Federalization would appear to be drafted, or at least conceptualized, prior to the 2021 coup, with a distinct focus on the center versus peripheral/ethnic aspects of federalism. The author even states his hope that “transitional Myanmar may be used to illustrate some issues in constitutional studies, especially how a current quasi-federal constitution may be amended or upgraded into a more federal constitution to strengthen democracy and realize a program of reconciliation.” This clearly did not happen. What went wrong? And what can be done to solve the federalist enigma in Myanmar when the next critical juncture arrives?
For starters, transitional Myanmar was still dominated by the military. And the infusion of political activity into praetorian society bred instability. Politics of Federalization argues that there were options for various types of “incomplete” federalism to begin to address the relationship between the center and the periphery. However, it was the intra-Burman rift that set Myanmar apart and overrode any momentum to focus on federalization between the central government and various ethnic groups.
How this intra-Burman relationship evolves post-conflict will go some distance in dictating what options are available for any post-conflict federalization. We already have an idea of how things will go should the Tatmadaw be able to consolidate their position. The greater unknown is what happens if the opposition win. Authority, for one, must exist before it can be limited. Meanwhile, divided societies without centralized power are inherently unstable. But what would authority/centralized power look like in a post-junta Myanmar?
Without question, should opportunities to nurture federalization arise, Myanmar will need to chart is own path. Politics of Federalization explores the case studies of various federalist experiments around the world. And sure, lessons can be drawn. But there is not a single model that could necessarily be transplanted to cure the Myanmar patient. Additionally, given the weak state of political institutions in the country (another situation which must be addressed), the role of elites/leadership will be paramount during any transition. For decades, weak political institutions fueled a lack of political stability, which also provided opportunity for Myanmar’s armed forces – as arguably one of the better organized institutions in the country.
Finally, argues Preecharush, those involved in negotiations will need to appreciate “the nature of realist politics. Based on the principle that permanent friends or foes do not exist in politics, only political interests and strategic survival.” This observation will undoubtedly hold true as well when Myanmar is presented with the next critical juncture to determine the fate of federalism in the country. We can only hope that it does not become but the next on a list of missed opportunities.
Title: The Politics of Federalization in Myanmar
Author: Dulyapak Preecharush
Publisher: Routledge 2023
Reviewed by: Joseph Ball
